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INTRODUCTION
Too often, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 19831 ("§ 1983 claims") are
meritorious, yet plaintiffs leave the courtroom uncompensated and
defendants leave the courtroom unsanctioned. In many instances a
civil rights violation has occurred, but the defendant asserts qualified
immunity and the case is closed before trial, without any enforce-
ment of the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Although
the court may pronounce that there was a constitutional violation
prior to dismissing the case on qualified immunity grounds, such a
pronouncement has no real effect, as the case will still be dismissed
without a judgment being entered against the defendant.4  And if
there is no repercussion for violating the law, then there is no real
enforcement of that law; such is the unfortunate effect of the quali-
fied immunity doctrine.
According to the doctrine of qualified immunity, a viable § 1983
action will be dismissed against a state or local official if "[the offi-
J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2001, University of
Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Tamany Vinson, Carlos S. Montoya, and the rest of the staff
of the Journal of Constitutional Law for their tireless efforts. I would also like to thank Professor
Seth Kreimer for inspiring me to write on this topic.
I Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003), providing in part:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State ..., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other persons
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in eq-
uity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
See David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism
and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 67-72 (1989) (discussing the
procedural aspects of the qualified immunity doctrine and noting that "[t]he Supreme Court
has placed substantial emphasis on pre-trial adjudication of the qualified immunity issue").
Throughout this Comment any reference to the Fourteenth Amendment implicitly in-
cludes the Fourth, Fifth, and Eight Amendments as incorporated and applied to the states.
4 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (declaring that there was a constitutional
violation, but the officer successfully pled qualified immunity and the case was dismissed).
5 Section 1983 covers violations of the Fourteenth Amendment by state and local officials.
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (citing the title of the original Ku Klux Act of 1871 as "an
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cial's] conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or consti-
tutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 6  A
"reasonable officer, 7 is not expected to know the most recent devel-
opments or nuances in the law. However, if it becomes obligatory for
him to possess such knowledge, the "reasonable officer" will become
one with a higher knowledge base, which will lead to higher expecta-
tions from the courts regarding what a "reasonable officer" would
have known. An officer who is required to know about constitutional
law is less capable of seeking refuge in the doctrine of qualified im-
munity.
This Comment explores what Congress can do through legislation
to facilitate the creation of a more well-informed police force nation-
wide, so that the "reasonable person" as discussed in Harlow v. Fitzger-
ald, is one with a higher knowledge base of constitutional law. An of-
ficer with greater knowledge will raise the courts' expectations of
what constitutes a "reasonable person." It will be more difficult for §
1983 defendants to successfully assert qualified immunity, making
pre-trial dismissals of § 1983 actions less common; therefore making
recovery and vindication more likely for § 1983 plaintiffs.
There are multiple means by which Congress can achieve a similar
end of a better informed police force and the resulting decrease in
the success of qualified immunity assertions. These include the crea-
tion of a federal program to educate the officers or the attachment
of a condition on spending that would require the states to educate
their own officers. 9 However, these will not be the focus of this Com-
ment. Rather, this Comment focuses solely on the use of Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, known as the "Enforcement Clause."' °
In spite of the significant obstacles to Congress's use of the Enforce-
ment Clause announced in City of Boerne v. Flores," I contend that the
language used by the Court in City of Boerne and its other recent
Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and for other Purposes"). For a further discussion of Monroe and its impact on the shap-
ing of § 1983 litigation, see Rudovsky, supra note 2, at 28-31.
6 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (emphasis added).
7 Although Harlow uses the phrase "reasonable person," the constitutional guarantees to
which this Comment will refer are only enforceable against the state. Therefore, the only "per-
son [s]" who need to know the law are state and local law enforcement officials. I will be treat-
ing "reasonable person" as the equivalent of "reasonable officer."
The creation of a federal program that uses only federal resources to educate law en-
forcement officers does not appear to implicate any constitutional problems.
9 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-12 (1987) (discussing the requirements for
the attachment of a condition on spending).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article.").




cent Enforcement Clause decisions" demonstrates that passing legis-
lation to educate law enforcement officers is an appropriate and con-
stitutional use of Congress's enforcement power.
Prior to discussing my proposal's viability under the Enforcement
Clause jurisprudence, however, Part I will first discuss the qualified
immunity doctrine as developed by the Supreme Court. Part II ex-
plains how the "Educate Law Enforcement Officers Act" ("ELEO")
13
constitutes enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus fits
squarely within the language of Section 5. Part III analyzes the line of
cases that developed the congruence and proportionality standard,
beginning with City of Boerne, and then demonstrates how ELEO satis-
fies that standard. Finally, Part IV concludes the Comment and in-
cludes a brief discussion of the beneficial effects ELEO will have for
prosecutors.
I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY4
A. The Development of the Qualified Immunity Doctrine
Qualified immunity cases stretch back over twenty-five years, and
have undergone a significant change since the doctrine's inception as
a defense to § 1983 claims. The immunity defense was first applied to
§ 1983 actions in Pierson v. Ray,15 where the Supreme Court con-
cluded that Congress did not intend to abolish common law immuni-
ties, available for false arrest and imprisonment cases, when it en-
acted § 1983.16 The Supreme Court held that a defense of "good faith
and probable cause" was available to the defendants in this action."
Because the law that the defendant police officers relied upon in ar-
resting the plaintiffs was later deemed invalid, the Court stated in
12 Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav., 527
U.S. 666 (1999).
13 The "Educate Law Enforcement Officers Act" is the name I have given to my proposed
hypothetical piece of legislation that, if passed by Congress, would mandate the education of all
law enforcement officers.
14 Aside from my belief that qualified immunity too often prevents a civil rights plaintiff
from obtaining compensation, I am not providing an extensive critique of the doctrine alto-
gether. In Part II, I intend to provide an overview of the Supreme Court's development of the
doctrine. Many other authors have devoted entire articles to the topic of qualified immunity,
and I encourage the interested reader to examine other articles. See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, The
Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV.
261, 267 (1995) (providing an extensive critique and suggesting, among other things, that there
should be "immunity rules" rather than "immunity standards").
15 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (applying immunity to Mississippi police officers when African
American ministers brought a § 1983 action against them).
16 Id. at 554.
17 Id. at 557.
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upholding a claim of immunity that "a police officer is not charged
with predicting the future course of constitutional law."' 8 The Court
proceeded to discuss the significance of the intent of the arresting of-
ficers. The Court concluded that although the law was not invalid at
the time the arresting officers relied upon it, the case had to be re-
manded to the trial court for a determination of whether the arrest
was to "[preserve] the custom of segregation in Mississippi" or "for
the purpose of preventing violence." 19 It is evident that the Court
deemed the subjective intent of the officers an integral part of the
immunity analysis.
Following Pierson, the Supreme Court began to extend the doc-
trine of qualified immunity. In Wood v. Strickland,20 the Court more
clearly enunciated the two-pronged nature of the qualified immunity
standard when it stated that immunity will not be granted if the de-
fendant "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he
took within his sphere of responsibility would violate the constitu-
tional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with the mali-
cious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other
injury to the [plaintiff] .,,21 The Court enunciated both objective and
subjective prongs to the qualified immunity test. Therefore, only "if
the [defendant] has acted with such an impermissible motivation or
with such disregard of the [plaintiff's] clearly established constitu-
tional rights that his action cannot reasonably be characterized as be-
ing in good faith" 22 could a plaintiff recover damages under the
Strickland test.
This dual standard, however, was short-lived. The two-pronged
analysis developed in Wood v. Strickland required a determination by
the fact finder of the subjective motivation of the defendant. The
need for such a finding made the pretrial dismissal of a § 1983 case
on qualified immunity grounds unlikely, thus potentially exposing
defendants to lengthy and ultimately unnecessary litigation. Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court decided to eliminate the subjective prong
of the qualified immunity test in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.3 The Supreme
Court announced that "government officials performing discretion-
ary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (considering a § 1983 suit between plaintiff high school students and
the defendant school board members).
21 Id. at 322.
22 Id.
23 457 U.S. 800 (1981).
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known. 24 Today, this is the standard to which claims of qualified
immunity are judged.
Harlow also illustrates the Court's acknowledgment that when
qualified immunity is asserted by an official, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment goes unenforced.2' The Court stated that "action[s] for dam-
ages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitu-
,,26tional guarantees. If qualified immunity precludes damage actions,
then qualified immunity is blocking the only "avenue" to enforce-
ment and vindication. The Court, however, does not appear to see
this as a significant problem.
Cases that have reached the Supreme Court after Harlow have ex-
pounded upon this standard without providing any substantial
change. In Anderson v. Creighton2 7 the Supreme Court again addressed
"whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held
personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action."28 The
Court restated its test for qualified immunity, stating "[t]he contours
of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right" and "that in the
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent., 29 Some
of the language employed by Justice Scalia in reaching his seemingly
impossible conclusion that the officer in Anderson "reasonably acted
unreasonably" ° provides support for the contention that officers
educated under ELEO will be less capable of claiming qualified im-
munity. The Court, through Justice Scalia, stated that the "relevant
question" in Anderson was "whether a reasonable officer could have
believed Anderson's warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly
established law and the information the searching officer possessed. 3 1 Per-
haps an officer informed of the relevant case law, in this instance
Fourth Amendment case law, could be presumed to possess more ex-
tensive "information." Further, the Court restated its belief that
qualified immunity is meant to protect officials from personal liability
"as long as their actions are reasonable in light of current American
law."3 2 However, the Court did not answer how officers are supposed
to know if their actions conform to "American law" if they are un-
aware of what the law is.
24 Id. at 818.
25 See infra Part III.
26 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
27 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
28 Id. at 639.
29 Id. at 640.
30 Id. at 643.
3 Id. at 641 (emphasis added).
32 Id. at 646.
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Since Anderson, the Supreme Court has done little to tinker with
the doctrine of qualified immunity. In Conn v. Gabbert33 the Court
explained that a court dealing with a claim of qualified immunity
"must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the depriva-
tion of an actual constitutional right" prior to determining whether
the officer is entitled to qualified immunity.34 This initial determina-
tion, the Court claims, prevents an infinite regress and allows for the
constitutional question to be resolved "to the benefit of both the offi-
cers and the general public." 5 However, the plaintiff whose rights
were violated receives no discernable benefit.
B. ELEO's Impact on Qualfied Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity has some valid rationales that
this Comment does not refute.36 This Comment merely seeks to illus-
trate that improvements can and should be made to the doctrine's
application. Undeniably, law enforcement officers provide a difficult
and valuable service to society. However, this does not mean that
those officers would not benefit from a constitutional education.
Police officers should be protected (and are protected through
qualified immunity) from some liability when performing their jobs.
Chief Justice Warren was correct when he stated that "[a] police-
man's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being
charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has
probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does."37 A
knowledgeable police officer, however, will less frequently find him-
self in such a paradox. I acknowledge that the qualified immunity
defense is based on "an explicit balancing of interests," s only one of
which is compensation for victims of constitutional violations. This is
why ELEO aims to decrease (not eliminate) the prevalence of suc-
cessful qualified immunity claims and achieve a corresponding in-
33 526 U.S. 286 (1999).
34 Id. at 290.
35 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
" See, e.g., Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23
GA. L. REV. 597, 601 (1989) (stating that such valid rationales include protecting "public offi-
cials from being sued for every error in judgment, thereby diverting their attention from their
public duties, preventing them from independently exercising their discretion because of fear
of damages liability, and discouraging qualified persons from seeking public office at all").
37 Pierson v. Ray, 286 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
3s Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 Mo. L. REV. 123, 129 (1999)
(discussing the balance between providing absolute protection to government officials which
would "eviscerate § 1983" and providing no protection which would subject those officials to
liability when acting in complete good faith); see also, Rudovsky, supra note 2, at 73 ("Formulat-
ing the proper standard for qualified immunity presents several fundamental questions con-
cerning the appropriate balance between several competing interests. .. ").
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crease in plaintiffs having their full day in court. This will be
achieved because as ELEO increases the knowledge of all officers,
courts will begin to expect the ELEO-educated "reasonable officer" to
know more than the current "reasonable officer." Thus, cases will
less frequendy be dismissed before trial on qualified immunity
grounds.
Even the staunch proponents of the doctrine of qualified immu-
nity should favor my proposal. The only reason why a successful plea
of qualified immunity would become less prevalent under ELEO is
because officers would be better educated and thus would be in a bet-
ter position to discern whether their behavior violates the Constitu-
tion. Qualified immunity will still be available for truly deserving of-
ficers, but will not be available to those officers who had the
knowledge to realize that they were violating the Constitution. One
argument in favor of qualified immunity is that we want to encourage
citizens to join the police force and they will not do so if they are sub-
jecting themselves to civil liability.39 A second argument is that we
want officers on the job to act without fear of exposing themselves to
civil liability.4 0 These are legitimate concerns. However, an individual
should be neither deterred from becoming a law enforcement officer
nor deterred from exercising his discretion as an officer, simply be-
cause he will be held responsible for the knowledge obtained
through his constitutional education. Expecting officers to be re-
sponsible for knowledge obtained under ELEO is not onerous and
cannot be considered to defeat the legitimate rationales for qualified
immunity's existence in our judicial system. While the expectations
of the officers will rise, ELEO will provide the necessary education so
that the officers can meet those expectations. Under ELEO, a court
will not expect any more of the officer than can be expected from the
constitutional education provided to that officer. A deserving officer
will still be able to seek refuge in the doctrine of qualified immunity.
If the Harlow standard is satisfied after accounting for the officer's
constitutional education, then an officer will still be able to success-
fully assert qualified immunity.
II. ELEO AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Overall, the doctrine of qualified immunity presents a significant
barrier for civil rights plaintiffs. The evolution of the doctrine from
Pierson to the present illustrates the courts' reluctance to hold law en-
forcement officers liable for their unconstitutional actions.4' When
39 See Kinports, supra note 36, at 601.
40 Id.
41 See supra notes 14-38 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs cannot, because of qualified immunity, successfully litigate
their Fourteenth Amendment claims using § 1983, the Fourteenth
Amendment essentially goes unenforced; if you can violate a law
without experiencing any recourse, there is no enforcement. By pass-
ing ELEO, Congress will be limiting the prevalence of the Fourteenth
Amendment being violated without any recourse, thus enforcing the
Amendment."
That Congress has this power to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is obvious from its language, which states that Congress has the
"power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article. 42 Recall that the Amendments that regulate the behavior of
all police officers, such as the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments,
have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment dictates how
an officer can perform his job and remain within the confines of the
law at the same time." If officers are updated on and taught about
these pertinent areas of constitutional law, qualified immunity claims
will become less successful. Plaintiffs will be better able to obtain
judgments against police officers who violate their civil rights, thus
providing better enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment's con-
stitutional guarantees.
It is for this reason that it must be considered proper use of the
enforcement power to require law enforcement units to regularly
provide continuing legal education for its officers. This continuing
legal education will cover developments in areas of constitutional law
that pertain directly to the job that these officers are employed to
perform. States require professionals in certain occupations to keep
abreast of developments in their fields through continuing educa-
tion,45 and such a requirement cannot be considered less important
for law enforcement officers. If ELEO supplies the proper education,
the qualified immunity barrier can be overcome, and the Fourteenth
Amendment can be enforced with increased frequency and force.
42 One must remember that fitting within the language of the Fourteenth Amendment is
only the first step in proving ELEO's constitutionality. ELEO must also pass the congruence
and proportionality test developed in City of Boerne, as discussed in depth in Part IIl.
43 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting "unreasonable searches and seizures").
45 As of'January 1, 2003, thirty-nine of fifty states require some form of continuing legal edu-
cation for lawyers. These states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Idaho, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Kentucky, Minnesota, Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennes-
see, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See
International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans, Continuing Legal Education for Attor-
neys, at http://www.ifebp.org/education/epconte3.asp (last visitedJuly 14, 2003).
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ELEO's fit into Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is further
evidenced by Congress's enactment of § 1983 to enforce the provi-
sions of that Amendment.4 6  The doctrine of qualified immunity,
however, inhibits successful § 1983 litigation and thus inhibits the en-
forcement of the Fourteenth Amendment.47  If ELEO is passed, Con-
gress will be enforcing the Amendment in the truest sense of the
word, for § 1983 litigants will become more successful and therefore
better able to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. If with Con-
gress's involvement there is more § 1983 success and thus more en-
forcement, Congress is constitutionally using its Section 5 power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the Supreme Court set up quite an obstacle in City of
Boerne, legislation requiring law enforcement officials to be informed
of the state of constitutional law fits squarely within Congress's power
under the Enforcement Clause. Qualified immunity prevents the
Fourteenth Amendment from being enforced, in any significant
sense of the word because aside from violations so flagrant that they
become criminal,48 successful § 1983 actions provide the only mean-
ingful mechanism through which civil rights can be enforced.
The jurisprudence surrounding attorneys fees and 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b) ' also supports the claim that ELEO would constitute proper
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court
has stated, with regard to attorneys fees in § 1983 litigation, that law-
yers who represent civil rights plaintiffs are acting as "private attor-
neys general.' 1 Without the participation of these "private attorneys
general," civil rights would go unvindicated . Generally speaking,
the job of an attorney general is to enforce and prosecute the law on
46 See supra notes 3, 5.
47 See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (accepting a plea of qualified immu-
nity, meaning that the plaintiff whose rights were declared by the Court to have been violated
had no recourse and Fourteenth Amendment did not provide any real protection).
48 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2003) (providing criminal penalties for instances of conspiracy
to "injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person"); 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2003) (allowing for
criminal punishments for anyone who "willfully subjects any person ... to the deprivation of
any rights... secured or protected by the Constitution," and increasing the punishment for
instances resulting in "bodily injury").
49 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court admitted that "actions for damages may offer
the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional rights." 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
50 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2003) ("the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs").
51 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 122 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (referring to the
availability of attorneys fees under § 1988 as the "private attorney general theory").
52 City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986) ("[A] civil rights plaintiff seeks to
vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary
terms.").
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behalf of government.5s Therefore, a "private attorney general" must
be considered to be enforcing the dictates of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Through ELEO, Congress would be supplementing the
enforcement by these private attorneys general, which itself should be
considered enforcement within the meaning of Section 5.
III. CONGRESSIONAL USE OF THE ENFORCEMENT CLAUSE
5 4
Although ELEO appears to be facially consistent with the lan-
guage of the Enforcement Clause, the Supreme Court's decision in
City of Boerne v. F/ores5 has made it nearly impossible for Congress to
effectively use its Section 5 enforcement power. 6 Prior to the City of
Boerne decision, the Court had upheld Congress's use of its enforce-
ment power under the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments when addressing voting rights in City of Rome
v. United States,57 Katzenbach v. Morgan,'5 Oregon v. Mitchell,9 and South
Carolina v. Katzenbach.6° In those cases, the Court seemed to view
Congress's enforcement power to be quite broad.6' However, since
City of Boerne, the Court has repeatedly blocked Congress's efforts to
use the power given to it by the framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.62 Therefore, the Court's penchant for striking down such legis-
lation presents the most formidable barrier to the type of legislation
proposed in this Comment.
A. The City of Boerne Decision
The City of Boerne decision addressed Congress's use of its Section
5 enforcement power to pass the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 ("RFRA").63 The RFRA was passed in response to a decision
in which the Court upheld the denial of employment benefits to
53 See BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 125 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "attorney general" as "[t]he
chief law officer of a state or the United States, responsible for advising the government on le-
gal matters and representing it in litigation").
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
55 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
See infra Part III.A-B.
57 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
59 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
60 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
61 In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court stated that, "The Fourteenth Amendment... is a posi-
tive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 384 U.S. at 651.
,2 See infra Part III.A-B.
( 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1993).
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church members who had used peyote, over a defense implicating
the Free Exercise Clause.64 The Court believed that in passing the
RFRA, Congress had altered the previously defined meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause and that "[t]he design of the Amendment and
the text of Section 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Con-
gress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment's restrictions on the States."65 The RFRA was struck
down because it required more of the states than did the Free Exer-
cise Clause, and Congress is neither permitted to alter the clause's
requirements through legislation nor declare what those require-
ments are.66 Therefore, in City of Boerne, Congress's role was limited
to enforcement of the restrictions and guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment as previously defined by courts. The Court sent the
message that anything beyond the predefined scope will be struck
down as unconstitutional.
1. The Congruence and Proportionality Test
In order to assure that Congress adheres to this limiting principle,
the Court announced the "congruence and proportionality" test.67
The Court created this test to protect the line between legislation that
remedies or prevents constitutional violations and legislation which
makes a substantive change from encroachment by Congress. The
congruence and proportionality test states that Congress cannot pass
a law under Section 5 unless there is "a congruence and proportion-
ality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end."6" Generally speaking, the principle of congru-
ence focuses on the reach of the law in question as compared to the
number of jurisdictions in which violations of that law allegedly oc-
cur. 6 Therefore, the fewer nationwide violations that there are, the
less congruence there will be if the law covers the entire nation. Pro-
portionality focuses on a comparison between what the law forbids
and how a state could act and still be in accordance with the Consti-
64 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512-13 (1997).
65 Id. at 519.
Id. (stating that "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the
right is... it has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what consti-
tutes a constitutional violation").
67 Id. at 520.
Id. at 519-20 ("While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional
actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern,
and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and
must be observed.").
69 Id. at 520.
70 See id. at 530 (discussing the legislative record of the RFRA).
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tution.7' If what the law forbids is so expansive that it conceivably
prohibits constitutional state action, then there is no proportional-
ity.72 Both of these principles protect the ideal that it is for the courts
and not Congress to decide the substance of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's restrictions on the states. When a statute violates the congru-
ence and proportionality test, the Court believes that Congress
impermissibly takes over this decision-making role. Therefore, Con-
gress is limited to only passing legislation that conforms to the scope
of the right, as defined by the courts.73
The RFRA failed the congruence and proportionality test for a va-
riety of reasons. 74  The Court believed that unlike the Voting Rights
Act, the RFRA's legislative record was insufficient to warrant the im-
position of such restrictions on every state.8 According to the Court,
however, this incongruence was "not RFRA's most serious shortcom-
ing."76 The main problem with the RFRA was that it was "so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative object that it can-
not be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconsti-
tutional behavior."7 7 The Court found the RFRA's "reach and scope"
to be too broad, especially as compared to legislation in the area of
voting rights.78  The restrictions imposed by the RFRA on the states
were simply too stringent to be proportional, which essentially means
that the states could conceivably pass laws that would be constitu-
tional under the Free Exercise Clause that the RFRA would prohibit.
79
Therefore, the Court concluded that the RFRA was both incongruent
and disproportional.
71 See id. at 535 (describing the RFRA as "broader than is appropriate if the goal is to prevent
and remedy constitutional violations").
72 Id.
73 While I find the City of Boerne decision to impose too many constraints on Congress, there
are some who believe that the limitations are necessary. See, e.g., Michael Van Arsdall, Com-
ment, Enforcing the Enforcement Clause: City of Boeme v. Flores Chips Away at Congressional Power,
48 CATH. U. L. REV. 249, 291 (1998) (calling the decision a "step in the right direction").
74 Rachael Toker, Recent Development, Tying the Hands of Congress: City of Boerne v. Flores,
33 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 273, 297 (1998) (discussing Justice Kennedy's City of Boerne holding,
that the RFRA did not remedy "intentionally discriminatory laws" and "did not maintain a suffi-
cient nexus with the constitutional guarantees").
75 The Court stated that "[in contrast to the record which confronted Congress and the
judiciary in voting rights cases, RFRA's legislative record lacks examples of modem instances of
generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry." City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
Later the Court continued, stating that "[in most cases, the state laws to which RFRA applies
are not ones which will have been motivated by religious bigotry." Id. at 535.
76 Id. at 531.
77 Id. at 532.
78 Id. The Court proceeded to discuss how the Voting Rights Act was confined to those areas
in which there was the most discrimination, and that while Section 5 legislation did not require
'termination dates, geographic restrictions or egregious predicates," such limitations "tend to




B. Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions
After City of Boerne, congruence and proportionality became both
the litmus test for Congress's use of the Enforcement Clause and the
favorite tool of the Supreme Court to strike down federal enforce-
ment legislation that it believes encroaches upon the power of the
states by imposing requirements that exceed those of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Since the City of Boerne decision, the Supreme Court
has applied the congruence and proportionality standard in other
cases, including Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank,8 Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,81 and Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett.2 In each of these opin-
ions the Court referred back to the same language from City of Boerne
illustrating the point that "Congress cannot 'decree the substance of
the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States.... It has
been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what
constitutes a constitutional violation.' 8 3 It will be demonstrated that
the Court's reliance on this point actually supports the constitutional-
ity of ELEO. Further, the Court's explanations of the shortcomings
of the laws in Kimel, Florida Prepaid, and Garrett also support ELEO as
a proper use of Congress's Section 5 power.4
Florida Prepaid presented the Court with its first opportunity to ap-
ply the congruence and proportionality test that it had developed just
two years earlier in City of Boerne.8' Florida Prepaid challenged the Pat-
ent Remedy Act ("PRA"),86 which was Congress's attempt "to secure
the Fourteenth Amendment's protections against deprivations of
property without due process of law.", 7 The Court addressed whether
the PRA was unconstitutional and ultimately determined that it was
an impermissible use of Congress's Section 5 power.&8 The Court de-
clared that there was no congruence between the PRA and the ac-
tions it prohibited because there were only a "handful of instances" of
state patent infringement, thus Congress had failed to identify any
"pattern of patent infringement by the States." 9 Further, the Court
80 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
81 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
82 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
83 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519).
See infra notes 85-104 and accompanying text.
81 City of Boerne was decided on June 25, 1997 and Florida Prepaid was decided on June 23,
1999.
86 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1994).
87 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636
(1999).
B Id. at 637-39.
89 Id. at 645, 654. The Court later referred to the instances of states depriving patentees of
property and leaving them without a remedy under state law as "scarcer still." Id. at 647.
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deemed that the PRA's "indiscriminate scope" was disproportionate
to the Constitution's prohibitions because the PRA too pervasively
forbade otherwise constitutional state action.9 The PRA was there-
fore declared unconstitutional, and the Court had taken the next
step in constraining Congress's use of Section 5.91
One term later, in Kimel, the Court addressed the appropriateness
of another piece of legislation passed pursuant to Section 52 The
legislation in question in Kimel was the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act ("ADEA"). 9 Predictably, the Court again stressed that
Congress cannot determine the substantive meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment protections.94 Then, the Court applied the con-
gruence and proportionality test to the ADEA.95 Unsurprisingly, the
Court again found that the "substantive requirements the ADEA im-
poses on state and local governments are disproportionate to any un-
constitutional conduct that conceivably could be targeted by the
ADEA."9 6 The Court also looked to the legislative record of the ADEA
and concluded that it was incongruent because there was insufficient
evidence of unconstitutional discrimination by state or local govern-
ments to warrant Congress's passage of the ADEA.9' Because states
are permitted in some instances to discriminate on the basis of age
and because there were no legislative findings, the ADEA failed the
congruence and proportionality test.98
90 Id.
91 See generally, The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 200, 223 (1999) (provid-
ing a general commentary on the case as a whole).
92 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000).
93 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994).
94 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62. ("The ultimate interpretation and determination of the Four-
teenth Amendment's substantive meaning remains the province of the Judicial Branch."). The
Court, however, added the caveat that "the determination whether purportedly prophylactic
legislation constitutes appropriate remedial legislation, or instead effects a substantive redefini-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment right at issue, is often difficult." Id. With ELEO, however,
this determination would be very straightforward.
95 Id. at 82.
96 Id. at 83. The Court proceeded to discuss the constitutional stature of age classifications
and how age does not constitute a "suspect classification," meaning that "[s] tates may discrimi-
nate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification
in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Id. at 82-84.
97 The Court stated that "Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the
States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional viola-
tion." Id. at 89.
98 SeeJohanna Pirko, Note, The Erosion of Separation of Powers Under the "Congruence and Propor-
tionality" Test: From Religious Freedom to the ADA, 53 HASTINGS LJ. 519, 527 (2002) ("In addition
to the absence of legislative findings demonstrating any history of age discrimination by the
states, the Court based its determination that the ADEA was not congruent section [sic] 5 legis-
lation on three previous Court decisions establishing that employment discrimination against
the aged is subject only to rational basis review.").
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The most recent of the "congruence and proportionality" cases is
Garrett. In Garrett, the Court addressed the constitutionality of Title I
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA").' The Court
was quick to restate the now "long-settled principle that it is the re-
sponsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of
constitutional guarantees."'00 The Court began its inquiry by asking
whether Congress had "identified a history and pattern of unconstitu-
tional employment discrimination by the States against the dis-
abled."' ' The Court concluded that Congress had failed to make the
requisite findings and thus the Act was incongruent. 2  The Court
then compared the scope of the constitutional right with the scope of
the Act, and ultimately concluded that states were providing the con-
stitutional minimum and therefore the Act was a disproportionate
and an impermissible use of Section 5. 10 As expected, this case
hammered another nail in the coffin of Congress's use of Section 5.4
Presently, what constitutes valid enforcement of Fourteenth Amend-
ment has been severely limited.
99 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
too Bd. of Trustees of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2000). (citing City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 519-24 (1997)).
101 Id. at 368. The scope of the rights required to be afforded to the disabled had been de-
termined in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
102 The Court stated that "had Congress truly understood [the evidence in the legislative re-
cord] as reflecting a pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the States, one would expect some
mention of that conclusion in the Act's legislative findings. There is none." Garrett, 531 U.S. at
371.
103 See id. at 366-72 (discussing how Title I of the ADA required the states to provide accom-
modations that exceeded those required by the Constitution as determined in Cleburne).
104 See Mark. A. Johnson, Note, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett: A
Flawed Standard Yields a Predictable Result, 60 MD. L. REv. 393, 394 (2001) (arguing that the "ill-
conceived Section 5 formulation" resulted in a predictable outcome).
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C. How ELEO Would Succeed Where the Others Have Failed
° 5
The line of cases discussed above, beginning with City of Boerne,
has made it clear that Congress cannot "decree the substance of the
Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States.' 0 6  Using the
congruence and proportionality test, the Supreme Court has struck
down many of Congress's efforts to use its enforcement power be-
cause those efforts violated the prohibition against defining the sub-
stance of the Amendment.07  However, the shortcomings of the
RFRA, PRA, ADEA, and ADA, as found by the Court, could not be
found in ELEO.
The Court consistently relies upon the language in City of Boerne to
stress the point that it is the Court and not Congress that decrees theS 108
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment protections. With ELEO,
however, Congress would abstain from defining the substance of theFoureent Amedmen . 09
Fourteenth Amendment protections. Congress would be com-
pletely deferring to the judgments of the courts and their developed
definitions of the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment protec-
tions. Law enforcement officers would be taught constitutional law as
defined by the courts, thus eliminating the separation of powers con-
cerns that have arisen in other Section 5 cases. The Court has stated
that "Congress was granted the power to make the substantive consti-
tutional prohibitions against the States effective," but not to define
them."0 When qualified immunity is asserted, the judicially defined
105 The Tenth Amendment may raise other concerns regarding the constitutionality of
ELEO. In Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), the Supreme Court speaks of federalism
concerns when Congress attempts to interfere with the policing powers of the state. However, I
am a strong believer that the Fourteenth Amendment significantly altered the balance between
the federal government and the states. Therefore problems that may arise in the Commerce
Clause context due to federalism concerns should not arise in the Fourteenth Amendment con-
text. The Fourteenth Amendment was passed to specifically limit the states, and Congress must
be permitted to do so without raising federalism concerns that properly arise in other contexts.
Further, the Supreme Court has often distinguished between Printz-type analyses and City of
Boerne-type analyses. See, e.g., Penn. Dept. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (distin-
guishing between a constitutional exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause in
Printz and under the Fourteenth Amendment in City of Boerne).
106 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. The Court also stated that "[a]ny suggestion that Congress
has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by
our case law." Id. at 527.
107 See supra Part III.A-B.
108 SeeKimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 660-61 (1999); Bd. of Trustees of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 326 (2000) (referring to the portion of the City of Boerne opinion that makes this
point).
19 When I discuss Fourteenth Amendment protections in this context, I am referring to the
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments.
110 City of Boerne, 521 U.S at 522. In Kimel, the Court has described its role in Section 5 litiga-
tion as "determin[ing] whether [the law] is in fact.., an appropriate remedy or, instead,
merely an attempt to substantively redefine the State's legal obligations." 528 U.S. at 88.
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substantive constitutional prohibitions are ineffective, thus making
ELEO a proper use of this acknowledged power even in this Court's
eyes.
The concerns enunciated by the Court in the congruence and
proportionality cases, regarding Congress's overstepping its bounds
by defining the substance of the protections, is simply nonexistent in
ELEO. The Court developed the congruence and proportionality
test to decipher whether Congress had overstepped its bounds. With
ELEO, it is very clear that Congress is not overstepping its bounds be-
cause there is absolutely no congressional effort to define or expand
the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's protections.
The first step in this inquiry is always to define the scope of the
right at issue to make sure that the proportionality requirement is
met.' Historically, if the scope of the constitutional right is narrower
than the scope of the law passed by Congress, the law fails the pro-
portionality prong. 2 Here, the right at issue is the right of § 1983
plaintiffs to have the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment en-
forced in the courts.'3 The scope of ELEO, if passed by Congress,
would assure that this right is respected through the education of law
enforcement officers. This framework provides the basis for the pro-
portionality analysis of ELEO.
Admittedly, there is no constitutional requirement that speaks to
the education of law enforcement officers. Based on the congruence
and proportionality line of cases, critics of ELEO may rely on this fact
alone to demonstrate that ELEO is not proportional. Critics may also
claim that ELEO is worse than those cases because Congress is not
defining or expanding the Fourteenth Amendment's protections.
Rather, Congress is creating a new requirement. However, if those
critics recall the reasoning behind the proportionality prong, they
will see that the other line of cases is not analogous or applicable to
ELEO. In developing the proportionality prong, the Court reasoned
that it did not want the Constitution imposing requirement "X" on
the states and Congress imposing requirement "X plus" on the
states."1 4 Put another way, the Court did not want Congress to at-
tempt to define or expand the substance of the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Constitution says X and
ELEO says inform the officers about X so that when they get to court,
they cannot claim qualified immunity and the Fourteenth Amend-
I See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
639 (1999) ("[F]ollowing City of Boerne, we must first identify the Fourteenth Amendment 'evil'
or 'wrong' that Congress intended to remedy.... .").
112 See discussion of City of Boerne, Kimel, Garrett, and Florida Prepaid supra Part III.A-B.
11 As stated above and restated below, I believe that when qualified immunity is successfully
pled, the Fourteenth Amendment goes unenforced.
114 See supra Part III.A-B.
Sept. 2003]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
ment can be enforced. The Court developed the proportionality
prong to allay its fears of Congress overstepping its bounds by defin-
ing or expanding the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Arguably then, the proportionality test is inapplicable to ELEO be-
cause it does not trigger this fear. Through ELEO, Congress neither
defines nor expands the protections of the Amendment. If the pro-
portionality analysis is limited, as I believe it is, to a comparison be-
tween what requirements Congress imposes and what requirements
the Constitution imposes, then ELEO is devoid of proportionality
problems. Although critics may argue that ELEO is still constitution-
ally suspect because it imposes a requirement on the states that is no-
where in the Constitution, such an argument misses the point of the
proportionality prong. The Court explicitly stated in City of Boerne
that "[1]egislation that deters or remedies constitutional violations
can fall within the sweep of Congress's enforcement power even if in
the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional
and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved
to the States. ' '' 5 Therefore, so long as ELEO does not define or ex-
pand any protections (which it would not), and it deters and reme-
dies violations (which it would), it is devoid of proportionality prob-
lems and satisfies this first prong.
ELEO has no difficulty satisfying the remaining congruence por-
tion of the test. Congruence is determined, in part, by looking to the
congressional record developed during the debate over this legisla-
tion. As discussed above, each of the laws in City of Boerne, Florida Pre-
paid, Kimel, and Garrett had insufficient evidence in the record to sat-
isfy the congruence prong.'1 6 The Court deemed the evidence in
those acts' legislative records lacking adequate examples of violations
nationwide to warrant the passage of legislation under Section 5."
7
ELEO certainly does not have this lack of evidence. Thousands of
§ 1983 claims are brought each year."8 Among those thousands of
claims, qualified immunity is frequently asserted, meaning that the
problem of plaintiffs not having their day in court and defendants es-
caping unpunished occurs nearly everywhere." 9 A fully developed
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
11 See supra Part III.A-B.
:7 See supra Part III.C.
8 In the twelve-month period ending on March 31, 2002, there was a total of 37,541 civil
rights suits commenced by private individuals. It is unclear exactly how many of these suits were
§ 1983 claims, but presumably it was a large percentage. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics,
Table C-3: Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit and District (March 31, 2002),
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2002/contents.html.
9 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), has been cited positively by every circuit court.
See, e.g., Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 133 (2d Cir. 2002); Thomas v. Cohen, 304 F.3d 563, 568
(6th Cir. 2002); Brown v. Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2001); Wagner v.
Bay City, 227 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2000);Jean v. Collins, 155 F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 1998);
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congressional record will be replete with examples of qualified im-
munity being successfully asserted, which means that the Fourteenth
Amendment has not been enforced. The problem of civil rights vio-
lations going unenforced due to successful assertions of qualified
immunity does not only occur in a handful of areas, but rather it oc-
curs throughout the entire country. This is a key distinguishing fac-
tor between ELEO and the RFRA, PRA, ADA, and ADEA, where the
respective legislative records of those laws failed to indicate a suffi-
cient number of constitutional violations nationwide, thus making
those laws incongruent. ELEO's record will have more than enough
examples of the Fourteenth Amendment going unenforced. There-
fore, satisfying the congruence is a mere formality.
IV. CONCLUSION
It must not be overlooked that requiring law enforcement officers
to know the state of constitutional law will not only benefit civil rights
plaintiffs, but it will also benefit states in criminal prosecutions. If law
enforcement officers are better informed regarding what they can
and cannot do under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the amount
of evidence excluded under the exclusionary rule will decrease, and
will thus result in more successful criminal prosecutions.1 2 0 Because
the exclusionary rule requires that evidence obtained in violation of
the Constitution be excluded from trial, a law enforcement officer
educated under ELEO performing a criminal investigation may be
less likely to commit an error that could compromise the success of a
prosecution.
When an individual's civil rights have been violated by a law en-
forcement officer, that individual is entitled to have the courts en-
force the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment by providing com-
pensation or other forms of relief. Congress passed § 1983 to provide
for this enforcement by private individuals. However, this enforce-
ment only occurs when the plaintiff is compensated and vindicated,
and the defendant is held responsible for his violations. Without any
compensation or vindication, there is no court-ordered penalty im-
posed upon the violator, and thus there is no enforcement in any
significant sense of the word. Unfortunately, this is what the doctrine
of qualified immunity achieves. Because qualified immunity relies
Reece v. Groose, 60 F.3d 487, 489 (8th Cir. 1995); Archer v. Sanchez, 933 F.2d 1526, 1529 (10th
Cir. 1991); Lenea v. Lane, 882 F.2d 1171, 1177 (7th Cir. 1989); Baker v. Racansky, 887 F.2d 183,
185 (9th Cir. 1989); Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124, 128 (1st Cir. 1988); Jones v. Pruit &
Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1988). The district courts which have extensively ap-
plied Anderson are too numerous to list.
120 The landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), held that all evidence obtained
in a search or seizure that violates the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in state prosecutions.
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upon what a court could expect a reasonable officer to know about
the state of the law, an education program such as ELEO will raise
the court's expectations and raise the likelihood of being a successful
§ 1983 plaintiff.
The more success § 1983 plaintiffs have, the more the Fourteenth
Amendment is being enforced. Congress has been given the power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, and by passing ELEO, that is
exactly what it will be doing. In spite of the tight constraints that the
Supreme Court has placed upon Congress's use of Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, ELEO constitutes a use of this power that
must withstand a judicial challenge for three reasons: (1) ELEO
complies with the language of Section 5 itself; (2) ELEO does not de-
fine or expand the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's pro-
tections, which was the motivating fear of the Court when it an-
nounced the congruence and proportionality test; and (3) ELEO
avoids the shortcomings of other laws that the Court has struck down
as not congruent and proportional.
Congress must be permitted to utilize the important power given
to it by the Fourteenth Amendment and enforce the Amendment by
supplementing the efforts of those private individuals who themselves
attempt to enforce the Amendment by bringing § 1983 claims. With-
out Congress's interjection, the Fourteenth Amendment will con-
tinue to go unenforced each time an officer successfully pleads quali-
fied immunity. Mandating the education of law enforcement officers
will enforce the Fourteenth Amendment through an increase in
complete adjudications of § 1983 claims. The protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment are hollow if we accept that an officer's in-
sufficient knowledge of constitutional law is sufficient to prevent a
plaintiff form having his full day in court.
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